In an era of pervasive online surveillance, Internet users are in need of better anonymity solutions for online communications without sacrificing performance. Existing overlay anonymity tools, such as the Tor network, suffer from performance limitations and recent proposals to embed anonymity into Internet protocols face fundamental deployment challenges. In this paper, we introduce Practical Anonymity at the NEtwork Level (PANEL), a practical light-weight anonymity solution based on hardware switching. We implement a prototype of PANEL on a high-performance hardware switch (namely, Barefoot Tofino) using P4 network programming language, and examine the validity and performance of the prototype. Based on our empirical results, PANEL achieves 96% of the actual throughput of the switch and adds a low-latency overhead (e.g., 3% overhead in Skype calls), while offering partial deployablility and transparency (i.e., PANEL requires neither client-side nor server-side modifications).
INTRODUCTION
The state-of-the-art pervasive online surveillance apparatus is capable of recording, aggregating, and analyzing our online communications, allowing business and government agencies to control, monitor, and influence our online interactions [1, 2] . Even when the communication content is encrypted, its metadata (e.g., Internet addresses and protocol specifications) reveal critical information about the parties involved in the communication, which can be exploited by governments and corporations [3, 4] .
Unfortunately, popular anonymity systems today, such as Tor [5] , have been only successful in attracting the most privacy-conscious users due to their poor performance 1 . Under the hood, legacy anonymity tools require dedicated infrastructure: a series of overlay proxies to redirect traffic. This infrastructure typically consists of proxy servers run by volunteers, often with no performance guarantees, which causes bandwidth and latency issues [8, 9] .
To address the performance issues associated with the use of overlay approaches, a number of recent studies have proposed network-level anonymity solutions [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . However, these proposals are not readily applicable to today's Internet due to fundamental deployability challenges. Some solutions [10, 13] entirely modify the Internet routing and forwarding protocols, requiring a clean-slate design approach [17] . For instance, they rely on end-to-end source-controlled routing model and its variants, such as segment routing [10, 12, 13] , which are still experimental and not ubiquitously deployed [18, 19] . Further, existing proposals lack a clear partial deployment pathway [12, 13] , failing to take into account limitations imposed by different network actors in the wide area network, such as strict header format checking of Internet Protocol (IP) and transport layers by routers and middleboxes [20, 21] . Previous anonymity solutions [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] are implemented and tested only on software switches.
Our work is inspired by light-weight anonymity solutions (such as LAP [11] ); however, in this paper, we pursue an entirely different angle to anonymity systems, motivated by the observation that hardware switches are pervasive in the Internet and offer a high performance and port density [22] . We present Practical Anonymity at the NEtwork Level (PANEL), a partially-deployable, low-latency, light-weight anonymity system compatible with both software and hardware switching. In particular, PANEL offers:
• Network-level light-weight anonymity: PANEL is implemented by Autonomous Systems (ASes) and embeds light-weight anonymity into the Internet forwarding infrastructure. This obviates the need for a dedicated overlay and can provide ubiquitous communication privacy to users by default. Further, it mitigates the undesirable scrutiny drawn by the opt-in nature of overlay systems [23] .
• Partial deployability and compatibility with legacy network: PANEL provides a practical approach for deployability: it divides ASes on the communication path into PANEL-protected segments and legacy segments. ASes in a single PANEL segment are at liberty to choose the anonymization method from existing proposals [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] .
However, on the boundary of a PANEL segment, designated border routers (referred to as landmark routers) transform packets to standard IP and transport format with fixed size headers, and forward these packets to the legacy network. Also, in PANEL the end-to-end path is decided by each hop individually (hop-by-hop routing).
• Transparency: As demonstrated in Section 5, PANEL is transparent to end hosts and does not require client-side (or server-side) modifications.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
(1) We propose the first anonymity protocol designed for and tested on high-performance hardware switching fabric, offering low overhead and partial deployment.
(2) We propose a technique, that we refer to as privacy preserving line-rate source information hiding. As discussed in Section 4.1, this technique involves three main steps: (1) source address rewriting, (2) source information normalization (i.e., randomization of IP identification field and TCP initial sequence number), and (3) hiding path information (i.e., time-to-live randomization). Among these steps, source address rewriting based on softwareswitches has been mentioned in an earlier work [14] . However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to implement privacy preserving source address rewriting based on hardware switches.
(3) We implement a prototype of the proposed protocol using a high-performance programmable hardware switch (Barefoot Tofino switch [24] ) and P4 [25] programming language.
(4) We comprehensively evaluate our prototype and examine its validity and performance for different applications, such as web browsing and Skype video calls. Our empirical results suggest that that high-performance (line-rate) sender anonymity is achievable in today's Internet, using high-performance hardware switches.
This study sheds light on potential advantages of high-performance hardware switching for anonymity solutions, paving the way for further exploration in this area.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss design goals in Section 2, present an overview of PANEL in Section 3 and our design in Section 4. The evaluation of our PANEL prototype appears in Section 5, followed by a discussion of related work in Section 6, a discussion of limitations and potential extensions to PANEL in Section 7 and finally a conclusion in Section 8.
Drop rate
IPv4 [20, 26] 30% -70% IPv6 [27] 50% -90% [20, 26, 27 ].
DESIGN GOALS
In this section, we outline the basic design goals of our protocol, including the privacy properties we aim to achieve. In Section 1, we highlighted partial deployment and compatibility with hardware switching fabrics as the two major factors towards practical deployment of network-level anonymity solutions. We address these issues in previous proposals and showcase a solution that is compatible with the legacy IP network, is designed to run on hardware switches, and achieves anonymity properties while being transparent to end hosts.
Compatibility with Legacy IP Network
We allow legacy and PANEL networks to coexist, enabling a partial deployment model. Here, we discuss desired properties that allow partial deployment of PANEL, which differentiates it from prior work [11-13, 15, 16] . Standard Compliance: A number of prior proposals are based on packet-carrying state model [11, 13, 15] , in which session information is encoded in packet headers. However, carrying entire state information in packet headers proves to be impractical in the legacy network for the following reasons:
• First, while IPv4 [28] and IPv6 [29] allow for IP options in the header, in practice support for these fields is very limited in today's deployed networks. Table 1 summarizes the drop rate of packets containing IP options on the Internet, as reported by different measurement studies [20, 26, 27] . The alternative approach of carrying state in transport and application layer headers also faces deployment challenges: (1) . Considering the transport layer, the TCP options field is bounded in length (maximum of 40 bytes) and different protocols compete for that limited space [21] . (2) . The fate of new experimental options are unknown due to pervasiveness of middleboxes enforcing transport and application layer policies [30] . Also, embedding routing state information into application layer space exposes packets to the risk of being dropped by network firewalls that monitor application layer semantics. • Second, packet-carrying state can leak information about the identity of the user, or the end-to-end route, unless routing information is encrypted. However, we avoid assuming that line-rate packet encryption is available at all landmark routers, for practical purposes. PANEL aims to be compliant with protocol standards as well as the support offered by today's deployed networks.
Thus, PANEL does not use the packet-carrying state model and only adds a constant size small tag to the IP headers for packets sent to the legacy network.
Routing Compatibility: The source-controlled routing model, which many previous works are based on [12, 13] , provides a means to allow sessions sender to determine or influence the routing path. However, source-controlled routing and its variants such as pathlet routing [31] , are not ready for end-to-end deployment, due to unresolved incentive and security concerns [32] . Therefore, PANEL operates in the hop-by-hop routing model, where routing decisions are made independently by each landmark router. Also, PANEL allows for asymmetric routes between PANEL segments and for intra-segment routing, as discussed in Section 4.
Hardware Switching
The forwarding capacity and port density of hardware switching fabrics make them an indispensable part of the networking ecosystem from data centers and service providers to large enterprise networks [22] . The advent of programmable switching fabrics [24, [33] [34] [35] and the abstractions provided by high-level programming languages supporting them [25] , have enabled researchers to prototype and experiment with new protocols on hardware switching fabric for the first time.
A network switch often consists of a switching chip that acts as the fast forwarding plane, often called data plane, and a slower control plane with a richer instruction set (e.g. x86 CPU). Similar to OpenFlow [36] the fast data plane can communicate with the control plane via an API. Programmable data plane fabrics implement primitives such as match+action tables and limited stateful packet manipulation, which are mapped to a high-level language specifications, such as P4. Our design challenge was to work within the constraints of the language and the specific switching fabric utilized to modify packets at line-rate, which we further discuss in Section 4.2.
Privacy Properties
The privacy properties discussed below form the basis of our design. We note that in our design we consider the trade-off between privacy guarantees and feasibility of deployment for our solution, thus our design falls into the category of light-weight anonymity solutions [11] .
• Anonymity: A user, server, or a session is anonymous if it is not identifiable within an anonymity set, i.e., a set of entities with similar features [37] . In our light-weight anonymity model, we only provide sender anonymity, which implies that the initiating party of a communication session must remain anonymous.
• Unlinkability: The unlinkability property indicates that the chances of linking elements in the system (e.g., sessions and messages) is bounded by the a-priori knowledge of the observer, even after observing the system [37, 38] .
Given the capabilities of an adversary, if two sessions are unlinkable, no amount of observation from that adversary should increase his confidence that these two sessions are related.
• Path Information Protection: Adding multiple layers of mixing can increase the potential anonymity set, an idea first described by Chaum [39] and one that has been used in multiple settings [40, 41] . In our design, every additional PANEL segment adds a layer of mixing. However, topology-based analysis of packets with path information leakage can defeat the privacy benefits of iterative mixing (see Section 5.5 in [13] for more detail).
Therefore, PANEL ensures that packet headers do not leak path information, including path length.
OVERVIEW AND ENVIRONMENT
In this section, we first present a brief overview of PANEL design, then discuss the network environment and threat model.
Overview
A PANEL deployment is comprised of multiple PANEL segments, each of which contains one or more ASes. PANEL only dictates the behavior of landmark routers interfacing with the next segment and routing decisions internal to a segment are not defined by PANEL. Fig. 1 shows an end-to-end session from sender (client) to receiver (server). In direction 1, packet headers are rewritten at the boundary of the PANEL segment to achieve anonymity and session unlinkability.
Each landmark router rewrites the source addresses in packet headers and replaces them with local addresses. Session identifiers are also replaced with randomized identifiers, called tags. The original address and session identifier, along with other session information (such as segment-specific information), are stored at landmark routers. For the return path from the server to the client, each landmark, retrieves information stored locally and rewrites the headers in return packets in reverse direction. Thus, our work demonstrates two important ideas. First, that source information rewriting is sufficient to provide sender anonymity and session unlinkability in today's Internet. Second, PANEL achieves these properties at line-rate using existing abstractions available in programmable network devices with no client side modification.
As we will discuss in Section 4.3, this approach forces the return route to uses the same set of landmark ASes in the reverse order and we will further discuss the implications for participating ASes in Section 7.4. However, as shown in Fig. 1 , PANEL allows for asymmetric routes in the legacy network and internally in each segment.
Environment and Threat Model
An adversary's goal is to break the sender-anonymity or unlinkability properties of PANEL or reduce the anonymity set, as described in Section 2.3. Thus, PANEL provides these privacy properties against session receiver, every Autonomous System (AS) and passive or active eavesdroppers that are capable of observing, dropping, replaying and modifying packets either on the path or in compromised routers. We allow adversaries with a partial view of the network and those which are only capable of observing and controlling only a portion of ASes on the path. Similar to real-time anonymity systems such as Tor [5] , global adversaries and end-to-end timing analysis are outside the scope of PANEL [42, 43] .
To ensure PANEL is transparent to end-hosts, we delegate the task of protecting user privacy to the Autonomous Systems. PANEL provides privacy benefits even with a single AS deployment, however, additional PANEL ASes on an end-to-end path increase the anonymity set and improve session privacy. In the absence of other network-level anonymity solutions such as Dovetail [12] or Phi [15] , this means that the first PANEL-AS must be trusted, reducing our adversary model to that of the light-weight anonymity protocols [11] . We assume the interface between a PANEL segment and legacy network is defined by Internet Protocol (IPv4 [28] or IPv6 [29] ).
Finally, while payload encryption and more advance privacy preserving mechanisms such as onion routing [44] can help improve the confidentiality of content and metadata, we do not require that PANEL landmark routers support encryption at line-rate. Thus, PANEL leaves these functionalities to application and transport layers [5, 45, 46] , in order (1) is transformed in the first PANEL segment (2), with its source address and TTL randomized. The source IP address chosen at each landmark is from the PANEL IP pool. The packet is then forwarded in the legacy segment (3) as a standard IP packet. Additional PANEL segments (4) further anonymize the packet source by replacing its source address. not to overburden PANEL routers with cryptographic requirements, simplifying the deployment of PANEL on existing routers that do not support such capabilities at line-rate.
PANEL DESIGN
In this section, we explain how we achieve anonymity and session unlinkability on programmable switches. Our design is heavily influenced by our objective to make PANEL practical and deployable in today's Internet and applicability to primitives on programmable hardware switching fabric, such as match-action tables [22] . Also, we demonstrate how our design is compatible with legacy networks both in terms of routing and packet header format.
Privacy Preserving Line-rate Source Information Hiding
This section describes how to achieve anonymity through in-network source information hiding, based on the primitives available in programmable switching chips.
Source Address
Rewriting. While the idea of source address rewriting is not novel, we are the first to demonstrate how to achieve privacy preserving source address rewriting at line-rate on hardware switching fabric, without relying on overlay proxies. Thus, a major contribution of PANEL is to demonstrate that sender anonymity through source rewriting is achievable in today's Internet, using high performance switching chips. which will be advertised through BGP and will be used to replace the source IP addresses for all sessions. A session on route from source to destination is modified at each landmark PANEL router, replacing the source address with an IP address from the PANEL pool. As we will see in Section 4.3.1, the IP address is chosen at random using a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). In Fig. 2 , an instantiation of source rewriting is shown based on IPv4 addressing.
For each packet, the source address is rewritten at each landmark router and packet is sent to the legacy network where the routing and forwarding take place without any changes in the legacy network. 
Source Information
Normalization. Several fields in packet headers can be utilized to perform fingerprinting attacks. In the presence of passive adversaries, IP identification field and TCP initial sequence number (shown in Fig. 3 ) reveal information about clients' software. These fields are implemented using different algorithms on popular operating systems [47] [48] [49] and exploiting these fields to identify clients or to link different sessions of a user is a well known technique [50, 51] . Thus, the first landmark router normalizes these fields in packets to minimize the chances of such attacks. The landmark router must ensure that it is the first PANEL segment on the path between sender to receivers 2 .
Upon establishment of a session on a landmark router, a random offset is generated for each of the fields that will be added in one direction and subtracted in the reverse direction.
Hiding Path Information.
In the legacy IP network, time to live (TTL) or hop limit field in packet headers also leaks information about the distance to the original sender at any given vantage point. Assume that the initial TTL value T i is a fixed constant c. If an adversary observes a specific TTL value δ , then he can readily calculate the hop distance (d) to the packet sender. Furthermore, through pre-computation on the AS-level topology, the adversary can narrow down the list of ASes where this packet could have originated from. This can be detrimental to the iterative mixing property of PANEL, discussed in Section 2.3. Therefore, the initial TTL value T i must be randomized by a landmark router, as shown in Fig. 3 . To determine the probability distribution for TTL values, we use mutual information to quantify the information leakage for a distance d, through observing value δ . We assume d is chosen from a distribution D and our objective is to find a distribution ∆, such that T i 's chosen from this distribution leak the least information about the distance to source at any given vantage point. Thus, our objective function is the following:
Where I is the mutual information function, supp(∆ i ) is the range of possible values for T i 's and T min and T max are minimum and maximum values that the initial TTL value can take. Note that, by definition, the initial TTL has to have an upper bound (T max ). Also, it cannot be set to zero and has to be large enough such that packets on long end-to-end paths do not expire, thus a positive T min is needed (e.g. 64). We will discuss in Section 5.5 how to empirically estimate D and how to compute the distribution ∆. Fig. 4 . Once the first packet for a session arrives at the switch (1), the packet is sent to a local CPU or a specialized chip (2) , where a random tag is generated for that session (3) . The tag along with session information are inserted into the forward table (4) . Finally, the packet is modified and forwarded to the destination (5) . Subsequent packets for this session are matched and modified in the forward table, stored in the switch data plane (6).
Session Unlinkability with Randomization
To achieve session unlinkability, session identifiers, such as TCP ports, are randomized in PANEL. There are two challenges with randomizing session identifiers. First session identifiers must fit into small fixed size header space to be compatible with legacy network. Second, we do not assume that per session asymmetric cryptography is available at every landmark router, so routers must assign session identifiers independently. Therefore, we replace session identifiers with the output of a cryptographic pseudorandom number generator (PRNG), called "tags". As shown in Fig. 4 , we assume that a local agent or an external chip on the router generates these random tags for each new incoming session and guarantees that active tags are not reused. The tag is split and stored in lower bits of the source address and transport layer port numbers and further parts of IP and transport headers, when needed (discussed further in Section 4.3.1). Using secure random number generation guarantees that packet tags are independent of each other and provide tag bitwise unlinkability [52] . Once a tag is assigned to a session, the tag and the corresponding source information is stored in a key-value table, referred to as forward table and each subsequent packet will be matched by its source information (key) to retrieve its corresponding tag (value), as shown in Fig. 5 . Then the packet will be rewritten similar to the first packet using a match-action functionality available in programmable switching fabric [22] . As we will discuss in Section 5.2, in our current implementation key sizes are reduced using a hash function in the data plane.
Forwarding Responses in Absence of Return Addresses
Since routing on the Internet is based on the destination addresses, removing original source addresses at landmark nodes makes routing response packets challenging. Here, we describe how our design overcomes this challenge.
To be able to route the response, a landmark router must store the original session information. This information is stored in another 6 illustrates this translation in an asymmetric routing scenario.
Match-Action Translation.
Thus far, we have established that in PANEL, fixed size tags are placed in packet headers at every landmark node to identify sessions and sources in the absence of original headers and these tags are placed in the TCP/UDP port numbers and lower bits of IP address field. We apply tags to sessions through match-action tables [22] , referred to as forward and reverse tables in the data plane of the router, as shown in Fig. 7 Fig. 6 . When B sends a response to A, the return address of A is absent in the packet header. B knows that the request packet passed through Y because of the source address of the request packet observed by B belongs to Y . Thus, B will send its response to Y . Y receives this packet addressed to its landmark IP, checks its list of tags, and sees that the request originated from X . When the response arrives at X , addressed to its landmark IP, X checks its list of tags, and sees that the request was sent by A. Finally, the response has its destination IP address modified to the IP address of A and forwarded from X to its final destination, A.
are tagged using a lookup table. The first packet of each session will hit the local agent or a customized chip for tag generation, where tag is a unique identifier generated from a PRNG. 
Composition with other Anonymity Systems
Recall that PANEL provides only light-weight anonymity by focusing on sender anonymity, and omits receiver anonymity and payload encryption from its design. By composing PANEL with other anonymity systems, we can augment the privacy or performance properties of these solutions. 
EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the feasibility of our approach on programmable switches. We demonstrate our prototype followed by an empirical study of the parameters in our design and an estimate of the anonymity size of our solution in today's Internet.
Hardware Implementation
Our implementation is based on a real-world Barefoot Tofino switch [24] with 3.3 Tbps forwarding capacity. PANEL's forwarding plane code is written in a) P4, which is a field reconfigurable, protocol and target independence programming language designed as a platform for programming parse-match-action pipelines, through match-action tables in hardware, and b) a local agent written in python, running on an Intel x86 CPU, which performs tag generation.
Our testbed consists of a server connected to the Tofino switch through a Mellanox ConnectX-3 dual-port 40GbE network interface card. As shown in Fig. 10 namespace. Packets are passed through the switch via one Ethernet interface and received on the other interface. Finally, each packet is forwarded to its destination on the Internet via a local Ethernet bridge. Mbps and 118 ± 22 Mbps bitrates. These experiments show that we can achieve close to 92-96% of the switch capacity. Thus we expect that if we connect all the 32 ports on the Tofino switch to 100 Gbps interfaces, we can achieve Tbps forwarding capacity.
Validation and Performance
(3) Latency: We measured the latency for the Skype experiment above. We repeated the Skype experiment 10 times and measured the latency in the video received. As shown in Table 2 , PANEL adds only 3% latency over simple router for Skype calls. We also employed another method to measure latency incurred by PANEL. Using Gnu Wget software we fetched 100 websites from Alexa 5 , 100 times each. Fig. 11 compares the latency of PANEL and simple router for each of these 100 websites. We discuss how the majority of this latency occurs during the first round trip in Appendix A.
(4) Switch Capacity: To understand the number of sessions our Tofino switch can keep in memory, match-action tables with different key length were compiled on the switch, as shown in Fig. 12 the switch reaches the maximum capacity for keeping the entire table in the memory at key length of 21 bits.
Therefore, we use a hash function in the data plane to truncate the tag to match this key length.
Sessions Maintained by Routers
• How many sessions a router must maintain: To get an estimate of the number of sessions to expect on routers on the Internet, we have analyzed CAIDA dataset from 2016 6 For key lengths less than or equal to 21, the theoretical bound matches the practical bound, but after the 21 bit key length, we reach the SRAM memory limit on the switch and the practical bound starts to degrade. memory used to store session mappings. Truncating the output of the hash function to 24 bits, yields more than 16 million possible entries (an upper bound for the number of concurrent sessions we observed in the CAIDA dataset).
For each entry in the match-action table, PANEL stores 4 bytes of original IP address and 2 bytes of original source port. Thus, the total memory required for forward mapping is 96 MB. Similarly for reverse direction the same amount of memory is required, adding up to 192 MB for all entries. • How many public IPv4 addresses are needed: To compute the number of unique IPv4 address needed to map all sessions in the memory, we first computed the maximum number of concurrent TCP sessions observed in the data as an estimate for the number of sessions to be stored. Dividing this number by 65,536, i.e., the total number of ports available shows that we need about 100 different public facing IP addresses for this router to run our protocol with aging out occurring every hour. Note that the estimates from these traces are conservative estimates, since most routers will see fewer sessions.
Size of Anonymity Set
Previous network-level anonymity proposals only considered number of IPv4 addresses assigned to an AS [11, 13] or IP prefix size distribution [14] for quantifying anonymity. This approach does not take into consideration the number of active IP addresses and overestimates the AS sizes. We, on the other hand, take an active measurement approach to address this limitation. To study anonymity size associated with each service provider on the Internet, we count the number of active clients on each service provider. To this end, we consider the number of active IPv4 addresses as a lower bound of active hosts in each service provider. Previous research shows that a combination of active scans on ZMap [55] platform and data observed by Content Distribution Network (CDN) vantage points can provide an estimate for the number of active IPv4 addresses [56] . However, there is no breakdown by service provider in previous research.
For our purposes, we used Censys [57] , a platform that captures and processes Internet-wide scanning datasets (using ZMap-based scans) of multiple protocols, such as ICMP reachability, identifying DNS resolvers and HTTP(S) server.
Using Censys we queried the aggregated database of scans for 10 days in July 2018 and on average found over 156 million active IPv4 addresses that responded to Censys queries. We then found the AS numbers associated with these IP addresses. Fig. 13a shows that the total number of IPv4 addresses assigned to each AS is on average 50532 ± 989326 Also, as shown in Fig. 13b , the number of active IPv4 addresses per AS is on average 2448 ± 50794. We also compared the Fig. 13 . The histogram of the total number of IPv4 addresses assigned to each AS is shown in Fig. 13a followed by the histogram of the number of active IPv4 addresses per AS, shown in Fig. 13b . Note that the horizontal axis is logarithmic. Finally, the percentage of active IPv4 addresses over the number of IPv4 addresses allocated for the AS is shown in Fig. 13c percentage of active IPv4 addresses over total number of IPv4 address assigned to a single AS in Fig. 13c , with an average value of 8%. While this is a lower bound, Using the data from measurement studies that showed 25% of hosts on the Internet responded to ping request (see section 5 of [58] ), we estimate that 32% of assigned IPv4 addresses are active.
This indicates that there is adequate vacant IP addresses that can be utilized for PANEL IP address pool.
Finally, To understand how the anonymity set size increases with more ASes implementing PANEL, we assumed that the first two ASes implement our protocol and compute the total anonymity set. For this purpose, we chose Alexa 1000 top domains and their corresponding AS numbers and chose top 1000 ASes based on CAIDA AS ranking 7 . We then used CAIDA AS relationship database 8 to infer an end-to-end path for sessions originating from the top ASes (source) to the top domains (destination). Using this inferred path, we computed the sum of the total number of IPv4 addresses assigned to the first two ASes in Fig. 14a (140989 ± 142523) and the total number of active IPv4 addresses in Fig.14b (average of 3266 ± 2921). These graphs indicate that the total number of IP addresses assigned and the total number of IP addresses that are active can increase by a factor of 2.79 and 1.3 respectively, if two consecutive ASes implement PANEL. Fig. 15 . Hop distance distribution from vantage points for country Japan is shown in Fig. 15a . The optimized TTL distribution computed based on this distribution is shown in Fig. 15b .
.
Distance Distribution for TTL Obfuscation
In Section 4.1.3, we used a distribution to randomize the initial TTL values used by PANEL. In order to estimate that distribution, we first approximated the hop distance to Alexa top 1000 domains. We used RIPE Atlas traceroutes 9 , a global network that enables customized active traceroute scans. We collect traceroute data from 3 different vantage points within each country (repeated 10 times) then computed empirical frequency of distance shown in Fig. 15a . Then, using the equation 1 from Section 4.1.3, we found initial TTL distribution by solving the minimal mutual information equation (Fig. 15b ).
RELATED WORK
Network-level anonymity solutions can be broadly categorized into two different classes: 1) enterprise and local-area networks, and 2) wide-area networks. Enterprise and local networks: In this category, the scope of the anonymity solution is a single enterprise, local network or autonomous system, where all the networking infrastructure is controlled by a centralized authority. For instance, PHEAR [59] replaces identifying information in packet headers with flat tags, which are securely communicated to individual hosts using a centralized SDN controller. However, this solution requires client side modification. iTap [60] takes a similar approach and eliminates the need for a client side software patch. Wide-area network: PANEL operates in the wide-area network model, thus the following contenders bear more similarity to our design. The Address Hiding Protocol (AHP) [14] proposes a NAT-like design, which aims to accommodate forensics needs by making flow associations reversible, using a cryptographic solution. However, their solution lacks session unlinkability, does not consider legacy network compatibility and makes it difficult for clients in enlisted ISPs to host services. Tor instead of IP [10] proposed replacing BGP speaking routers with onion routers and rendezvous mailboxes. While embedding onion routing into the network layer would provide both sender and receiver anonymity, the approach demands expensive operations at line-rate and is also based on source-controlled routing.
Lightweight Anonymity and Privacy (LAP) [11] aims to protect end-host's identity from servers. In LAP, the first AS is trusted, similar to the PANEL design. However, forwarding information is carried in each packet, with the potential for packet headers to grow arbitrarily large. Also, each AS has to encrypt and verify its own forwarding information as packets pass through the network, performing a symmetric key operation per packet at each hop, as opposed to our solution that only requires a table look-up for packet forwarding. Dovetail [12] extends LAP to provide sender-receiver anonymity, with the help of a third party node called matchmaker. A client using Dovetail forwards its traffic to the matchmaker and notifies the matchmaker node about the final destination, using public key encryption. Then the sender chooses the final path among a number of paths proposed by the matchmaker. Both LAP and Dovetail leak the location of individual ASes in an end-to-end path between sender and receiver. PHI [15] , aims to solve this problem with a randomized path-segment positioning algorithm.
HORNET [13] offers security and privacy on par with Tor instead of IP, providing an onion encryption with every hop between the two ends of a session. Moreover, forward and return paths can be distinct in HORNET and information leakage about the length of the path and the location of each AS on the path is minimized. However, HORNET assumes that an end-to-end path is known to the sender, where the sender establishes a key for each individual session with every forwarding node on the path, using public key operations. Also, similar to Dovetail and PHI, HORNET lacks a clear partial deployment plan and is a source-controlled routing solution, which makes it difficult to deploy in the current
Internet. Finally, TARANET [16] , improves HORNET, adding traffic analysis resilience through a traffic normalization technique called end-to-end traffic shaping. While TARANET has strong anonymity guarantees, its bandwidth and latency overhead are higher than other network-level anonymity proposal. Table 3 summaries the differences between wide-area anonymity solutions.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss PANEL's limitations, extensions for header and payload encryption, the challenges posed by IP address spoofing, implications for participating ASes, and comparison to carrier-grade NATs.
Limitations
While the design of PANEL provides several attractive properties including partial deployment and being based on hardware switching, it does have several limitations, which we discuss next. [11] HORNET [13] TARANET [16] Dovetail [12] PHI [15] Tor Instead of IP [10] Enlisting ISPs [14] PANEL Table 3 . Related work comparison. Symbols , , indicate full, partial and no implementation in the solution respectively.
Platforms such as NetFPGA 10 can be used for a full hardware implementation of PANEL, which will reduce the latency overhead in the first round trip of the communication session.
• First AS Trust: PANEL is a light-weight anonymity protocol, as mentioned in Section 3.2. This implies that protocol operations are performed by PANEL ASes, and the first AS has to be the point of trust. However, trusting the first AS can lead to privacy concerns. Users requiring stronger privacy can still benefit from the composition of PANEL with the Tor network, as discussed in Section 4.4. • Tag Placement: The number of sessions a PANEL router can serve is bounded by the number of bits in packet headers allocated for session tags. Relying only on the port number and lower bits of the IP address might be insufficient for router with large forwarding tables, since it increases the chances of collision. To extend tags for IPv4 sessions, we can leverage the literature in IP packet marking, where the goal is to embed information in packets to be able to identify them later in upstream hops [62] . IPv6, on the other hand, provides a much larger address space for this purpose.
• TCP Fingerprintability: The variance between TCP implementations on different operating systems allows an adversary to fingerprint clients' operating systems [63] . To obfuscate subtle differences in TCP state transition or advertised TCP window sizes, a PANEL segment must employ network-layer security protocols such as IPSec.
Thus, TCP fingerprinting remains a limitation of PANEL and segments may choose to use more heavy-weight network-level anonymity solutions that also protect against timing analysis, such as TARANET [16] with higher overhead.
Header and Payload Encryption
We recognize that the advances in the field of networking will allow us to expand PANEL's feature set. For instance, we discuss how to use line-rate encryption to remove state from landmark routers.
Routing Encryption: Encrypting routing information is rather expensive to perform at line-rate and it is not currently supported by many routers. However, if routers are equipped with a cryptographic co-processors, our design can be extended to encrypt local routing decisions and replace tags generated using PRNGs in packet headers, as discussed in Section 4.3.1. Furthermore, currently the existence of a particular tag in upstream and downstream packets indicates that they belong to the same end-to-end session. If public key encryption is possible at packet level, tags in packet headers can be encrypted using routers' public keys to provide unlinkability between packets in different directions for a session. Payload Encryption: PANEL neither modifies the payload of packets nor does it perform onion encryption. We believe that payload encryption should be addressed in higher layers, such as IPSec or HTTPS [46] . Nevertheless, payload encryption, if possible at line-rate, can help improve anonymity and unlinkability.
Address Spoofing and Abuse Mitigation
Address Spoofing: IP address spoofing entails an attacker using an IP address not belonging to its address space as the source of spoofed packets. PANEL routers store per-session state in forward and reverse tables, and an adversary can exhaust the memory on the router. A session is determined by the source IP address and its tag (consider the port number as part of the tag). This enables an adversary to have another attack vector namely tag spoofing, in which the adversary can change tags while keeping IP address persistent to amplify the attack.
A general solution for tag spoofing is to rate limit tag generation in the first landmark AS. For orchestrated DDoS attacks, we envision filtering based on the characteristics of the attack [64] . There are also a number of filtering approaches based on characteristics of sessions, such as congestion feedback systems based on destination [65] or capability-based solutions [66] [67] [68] . Abuse Mitigation: Since PANEL removes source information from sessions, a server under Denial of Service (DoS) attack does not have any means to filter out connections based on their source address. Thus, we envision a STOP mechanism by which an AS hosting a server can request the first landmark (whose identity must be kept secret due to iterative path mixing) on the path of a session to block certain sessions, on behalf of the victim of the DoS attack. In the absence of return address for a PANEL packet, an AS can use the same packet header, to send this STOP request back to the first PANELsegment. To prove that the STOP packet is generated by the end host's AS, we assume there exist a PKI scheme for Autonomous Systems similar to S-BGP [69] . Using its private key, the last AS signs a STOP message and sends it with the same session tag to the first landmark, which in turn will terminate an abusive sender, an approach similar to StopIt [70] and AITF [71] .
Implications for Participating ASes
One incentive for ASes to deploy PANEL would be to pitch privacy as a differentiating factor, similar to how today's web browsers are pitching privacy to attract users [72] . Below, we discuss the cost implications for participating ASes. Equipment Costs: Equipment costs scale with the number of sessions an AS has to handle. An AS can choose to cap the number of external sessions it anonymizes. This presents an interesting trade-off between the anonymity set size and economic cost, since larger number of supported sessions lead to a larger anonymity set size, albeit with a higher cost.
Limited IP Addresses: The challenge of a limited number of publicly available IP addresses, especially for IPv4 addresses, can be addressed by having a PANEL segment share a pool of public IP addresses, and using ILNP [73] style location identifier to forward packets to the appropriate router, where the PANEL session mapping is stored. Asymmetric routing costs: Forwarding return packets in asymmetric routes increases the bill for an AS. However, an AS can lower this extra cost by capping the number of external sessions it anonymizes. We also note that ASes have the strongest incentives to support the privacy of their direct customers. Thus, the connections of these users can be prioritized in this process. Reputation costs: An AS can be flagged as untrustworthy for forwarding abusive sessions not originating from that AS. The design of abuse mitigation systems [74, 75] is currently an open question for all anonymous communication systems (even those based on overlay mechanisms, such as the Tor network).
Comparison to Carrier-grade NAT
Historically, network address translation (NAT) [76] has been widely used to work around the challenge of a limited number of IPv4 addresses. As this problem has become more acute in recent years, Internet service providers have started deploying carrier-grade NAT (CGN), also known as large-scale NAT, across their networks. CGNs allow a small pool of public IPv4 addresses to be shared among many hosts and customers, by placing the NAT logic on a service provider's access network, rather than the subscriber's edge network. Therefore, CGN shifts the NAT function from the customer premises to the service provider network.
We note that the CGNs themselves provide very basic anonymity properties, by multiplexing multiple hosts and customers via shared IPv4 addresses. The design of PANEL indeed shares some similarities with CGNs, and builds upon the basic anonymity properties they provide. However, PANEL also differs from CGNs in several important ways.
First, PANEL rewrites source information in a more rigorous and holistic manner than CGNs, including normalizing IP identification field, normalizing TCP initial sequence number, and hiding path information via time-to-live randomization.
Furthermore, the mappings between sessions and session identifiers (tags) in PANEL are not chosen deterministically, but are chosen in a randomized manner using a PRNG as described in Section 4.2. In contrast, such mappings (session outbound ports) in CGNs are deterministic. As shown by prior work, this determinism can be used to link sessions of users, especially in the case of permissive (full cone) NAT, which is quite prevalent in design of CGNs [77] .
Second, PANEL uses iterative path mixing to further enhance anonymity, via protocol deployment at multiple PANEL segments in an end-to-end communication path between a client and server.
Third, PANEL does not act as a multiplexer of internal destinations and thus, does not impose the kind of restriction that classical NATs place on network endpoints behind a NAT. For instance, in our design, a client can use the address of a server located in a landmark segment directly to access it. In fact, we argue that there need to be enough IP addresses allocated to individual hosts. Furthermore, PANEL explicitly mandates that service providers do not log the mapping between internal endpoint and global tags as discussed in Section 4.
PANEL also shares a number of common challenges with CGNs [78] . First, for scalability, both need to maintain device throughput and line-rate packet processing. Moreover, resource management, such as memory used to keep sessions state or IP pool size (number of public facing IPs) is also a key component of design for both technologies. There are a number of best practices around designing CGNs and protocols that interact with them [79] and studies have shown the result of these practices in different providers [77] . Some of the techniques for DoS mitigation such as ingress filtering [80] , TCP/UDP timeout are lessons applicable to both PANEL and CGNs.
CONCLUSIONS
In order to address one of the most challenging impediments that network-level anonymity proposals face (namely, deployability), we introduced PANEL .
The proposed approach is sufficiently simple to be implemented using primitives available in programmable hardware switches: we prototyped PANEL on a real-world Barefoot Tofino switch using P4 [25] network programming language.
PANEL offers (1) partial deployability, (2) low-latency, and (3) transparency (i.e., it does not require client-side or server-side modifications).
Our analyses demonstrate that PANEL offers a high throughput (96% of the actual throughput of the switch), lowlatency overhead (e.g., 3% overhead in Skype calls), and satisfactory anonymity set at the cost of a reasonable storage overhead (192 MB).
